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____________ 
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____________ 
 
GEORGE E. JOHNSON, JR., 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN P. RARDIN, Esq.; SOUTHEASTERN  
PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY;  
JOE CASEY, in their individual as well as their official  
capacity as state actors; ELLIS I. MEDOWAY, Esq., in their  
individual as well as their official capacity as state actors;  
JEFFREY LANDOSKY, Esq.; UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA, & Clerk #2; HOWARD A. ROSENTHAL, Esq.,  
in their individual as well as their official capacity as state actors;  
ARCHER & GREINER; GARY D. FRY, Esq., in their  
individual as well as in their official capacity as state actors 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-05542) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg       
__________________________________ 
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July 20, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 21, 2017) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
George E. Johnson, Jr. appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Johnson filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2013, alleging that the Southeastern Transportation 
Authority (“SEPTA”) and its counsel, Jonathan P. Rarden, committed fraud while 
defending his state court lawsuit.  In an order entered on October 9, 2013, the District 
Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint on the ground that Johnson’s claims were 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1  Johnson’s appeal to this Court was dismissed 
for failure to prosecute in 2014, see C.A. No. 13-4374.  Johnson then tried several times, 
unsuccessfully, to amend his complaint. 
 On June 20, 2014, Johnson filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), alleging fraud, that there was a conspiracy to 
disenfranchise him, and that the defendants had committed professional malpractice.  In 
an order entered on July 21, 2014, the District Court denied the Rule 60 motion, holding 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
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that Johnson “alleges no facts to support a finding of such egregious conduct.  Rather, his 
claim rests on a mix of insinuation and misunderstanding of the electronic docket entries 
in his case.”  Johnson appealed, and we affirmed, see Johnson v. Rardin, 627 F. App’x 
140 (3d Cir. 2015).  Johnson also unsuccessfully sought mandamus relief in this Court. 
  On November 15, 2016, Johnson filed another motion for relief from judgment, 
this time pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).  He alleged that the District Court’s order dismissing 
his complaint was void in light of fraud upon the court, but he otherwise repeated his 
previous allegations that SEPTA’s counsel had conspired to disenfranchise him; that 
SEPTA had “defaulted in this action in state court;” and that SEPTA’s counsel had 
committed professional malpractice.  Johnson noted that a void judgment must be 
reopened; the matter is not discretionary.  In an order entered on November 22, 2016, the 
District Court denied the motion, concluding that Johnson alleged no facts to support his 
claims.  Johnson appealed and submitted a motion for appointment of counsel on appeal, 
which we denied.  We also denied his motion for reconsideration and summary reversal.  
The matter is now briefed and ripe for disposition. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “On motion and just terms, the 
[District Court] may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding” where “the judgment is void.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).  Our 
review of the denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is plenary.  See Page v. Schweiker, 786 
F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1986).     
 We will affirm.  In his brief, Johnson contends that the appellees have conspired to 
disenfranchise him and that the District Court’s November 22, 2016 judgment “should 
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never have been scanned into the record, being clearly void and also indicating … some 
type of collusion between the clerk and the” appellees, Appellant’s Brief, at 2.  A “void 
judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised 
even after the judgment becomes final.”  United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 
U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments 22, § 12 (1980)).  “Rule 
60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain 
type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice 
or the opportunity to be heard.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
The District Court properly denied Johnson’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion.  Johnson has 
alleged no facts to support his claim that the District Court’s 2013 judgment is void.  To 
the extent that he has argued that the November 21, 2016 Order denying his Rule 
60(b)(4) motion is void because it was electronically signed by the District Court, we 
note that Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.2(13) gives the “traditional” and necessary 
force and effect to orders filed electronically without the original signature of a judge.  
E.D. Pa. Local Civ. R. 5.1.2(13). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order denying Johnson’s Rule 
60(b)(4) motion. 
